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In many environments, the input mechanism to a com- 
puter system is severely constrained. For example, a dis- 
abled person may only be capable of yeslno responses to 
prompts from the screen (by different nods of the head, 
eye movements, hand movements, or even by different 
thought patterns that are captured by a sensor). Alter- 
natively, the user msy not suffer from any impairment 
yet the environment precludes the use of a keyboard or 
keypad, as happens with tiny portable devices such as 
some of the smaller .mp3 players, voice sensors at the 
doors of restricted-access areas, and hands-free situa- 
tions such as constr~~r:tion work sites, operation of a mo- 
tor vehicle, etc. Finally, a case can be made, in situations 
where shoulder-surfing is prevalent (such as in crowded 
cyber-cafes), for deliberately resmcting the input to be 
a response that is hard to detect by a shoulder-surfer 
(e.g., left-click vs right-click), even though the user in 
such cases has a keyboard and is perfectly capable of 
using it. Requiring ,the user to remember a long ran- 
dom bit string and to'authenticate by entering each bit in 
the yeslno available input mechanism, is completely im- 
practical. This paper deals with the question of authen- 
tication in such environments where the inputs are con- 
strained to be yeslno responses to statements displayed 
on the user's screen. We present PassWit, a mnemonic- 
based system for such environments that combines good 
usability with high security, and has many additional fea- 
tures such as (to mention a few) resistance to phishing, 
keystroke-logging, resistance to duress and physical co- 
ercion of the user, and compatibility with currently de- 
ployed systems and password file formats (hence it can 
co-exist with existing login mechanism). An important 
ingredient in our recipe is the use of a mnemonic that 
enables the user to produce a long enough (hence more 
secure) string of appropriate yeslno answers to displayed 
prompts (i.e., challenges). Another important ingredi- 
ent is the non-adaptive nature of these challenges - so 
they are inherently non-revealing to a shoulder-surfer or 
phisher. The mnemonic is a sentence or a set of words 
known only to the user and authenticating server (in the 
server they are stored in a cryptographically protected 
way rather than in the clear) - the users are never asked 
to enter their mnemonics to the system, they only use 
the mnemonic to answer the server's challenge questions. 
Our usage of text for mnemonics is not necessary but it 
is what we implemented for reasons of convenience and 
compatibility with existing login mechanisms; we could 
equally well have used speech, video, or pictures. 
1 Introduction 
In 1998, Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act to re- 
quire Federal agencies to make their electronic and in- 
formation technology accessible to people with disabil- 
ities [I]. A major focus of the accessibility research 
is to improve the design of electronic interfaces in a 
way that does not prevent users with disabilities (espe- 
cially vision) from viewing them or navigating through 
them [7, 61. There have not been many studies on elec- 
tronic accessibility issues for users with motor disabili- 
ties [14]. 
The ability to securely use computer resources and the 
web provides more freedom for users with disabilities: It 
enhances their educational and entrepreneurial opportu- 
nities [14], as well as their ability to stay in touch with 
friends and family, to manage their finances, or shop on- 
line, all without having to rely on other humans to do it 
on their behalf (thereby improving their privacy as well). 
Many of the deployed regular authentication systems 
are difficult (even impossible) to use under the below- 
mentioned environments, environments that our system 
is designed to handle. 
Users with motor-disabilities: Not only para- 
lyzed patients (that have cerebral palsy, paraplegia, 
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toid arthritis or hand tremor I ,  or who are temporar- 
ily unable to use their hands (e.g., due to a broken 
arm or repetitive stress injury). 
Input constrained devices: Authentication using 
tiny portable devices such as some of the smaller 
mp3 players, game consoles, home entertainment 
systems, voice sensors at the doors of restricted- 
access areas, hands-free situations such as construc- 
tion work sites, operation of a motor vehicle, etc. 
Inherently non-private environments: Authenti- 
cation when shoulder-surfing is unavoidable such as 
in crowded places (e.g Internet access points, coffee 
shops, cyber cafes), in places where there are many 
surveillance cameras (e.g., labs, airports, shopping 
malls, etc.), in tight spaces such as an airplane while 
sitting in economy class next to another passenger. 
We designed a system, PassWit, that enables users to 
achieve security of truly random passwords by remem- 
bering just a mnemonic sentence (which they have sev- 
eral choices to pick from), and these users will be able 
to securely authenticate themselves by just answering a 
series of "yeslno" questions. 
This can be achieved without requiring any special in- 
put device, or any computation at client site. The au- 
thentication questions are designed in a way that a short 
mnemonic sentence can encode a long password. There 
is no restriction on the size of the mnemonic sentence or 
the password, if desired the security (hence the length) 
of the passwords can be increased by requiring the user 
to remember more than one sentence. Another important 
ingredient is the non-adaptive nature of these challenges 
- so they are inherently non-revealing to a shoulder- 
surfer or phisher. 
PassWit is safe against many attacks including shoul- 
der surfing, phishing, and acoustic attack. We use sev- 
eral measures against each type of these attacks such 
as displaying one challenge at a time, or displaying the 
challenges in graphical CAPTCHA [21] format if the 
environment allows graphical display. We also achieve 
duress resistance, which we will discuss more in the fol- 
lowing sections. 
Our design can work side-by-side with text passwords 
in UNIX systems. It is also compatible with pure text 
based interfaces as well as other media interfaces that 
can represent the text mnemonics (e.g. speech, video, 
pictures, etc.). 
Moreover, using text for mnemonics (as opposed to 
pictures, video or audio) brings more flexibility to our 
' ~ c c o r d i n ~  to International Essential Tremor Foundation, up to 10 
million Americans have Essential Tremor 
?stands for "Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Com- 
puters and Humans Apart" 
system, since it is compatible with text consoles and LED 
screens. There is no language restriction for our system, 
it can be implemented for languages other than English. 
Before going into the details of our system, we will 
briefly mention the challenges we need to overcome and 
give a glimpse of how our system approaches them: 
The authentication system would be able to work in 
input-constrained environments. Users with motor 
disabilities can input through switches that can be 
activated by simple muscle movements (e.g. raising 
the eye brow or eye-lid) or brain signals [1 l , 5 ,  171. 
In order to free these users from the need to ask the 
help of another person while authenticating them- 
selves to these systems, one has to come up with a 
secure authentication system that is usable by any- 
one who can control such a switch. In our scheme, 
only yeslno answers are enough for authentication. 
Of course the ability to provide yeslno inputs makes 
it possible to transmit any random bit string but it 
does not help at all for remembering which bit string 
to transmit (even the luxury of writing the password 
on a sticky note may not be available to the dis- 
abled person). Our scheme, on the other hand, is 
mnemonic-based and makes it possible to securely 
remember a long random bit string, by remember- 
ing only a relatively short sentence. 
Mnemonics have to be easy-to-remember sen- 
tences. Users with motor disability can be elder 
people that do not have a very strong memory. 
PassWit encodes a long random password with a 
short mnemonic sentence. Besides that, we use 
the news headlines as our corpus for generating the 
mnemonic sentences. We used newspaper headlines 
since they summarize a story, thus form a connected 
discourse, which was experimentally shown [15] to 
be much easier to learn than same amount of non- 
sense. Automatically generating easy to remember 
mnemonics with video or images is a more chal- 
lenging task. 
Shoulder-surfing attacks are very hard to avoid by 
disabled users, who are always in areas that are 
crowded (such as hospitals, or care centers) or al- 
ways have a second person (e.g., day care nurses) 
around. PassWit has several measures for pro- 
tecting the user against shoulder-surfing: i) using 
mnemonic based passwords, ii) not asking the user 
to enter the password directly, but performing au- 
thentication by asking the user a series of "yeslno" 
questions, iii) offering a different set of challenge 
questions at each time of authentication, iv) mak- 
ing the use of an input device that can be covered 















































The authentication system should not require the 
user to cany an extra portable device (e.g. calcu- 
lator) or even a paper and a pen. In PassWit the 
user just reads the challenge statements prompted 
to h i d e r  at authentication time, and if the chal- 
lenge contains one of the mnemonic words the user 
inputs "yes", otherwise "no". 
The password initialization and reset should be 
easy. In PassWit, initialization consists of ask- 
ing the users on which topic they would like their 
mnemonic sentence to be, and later providing them 
many alternative mnemonic sentences. Note that 
the users can use only yeslno answers to input their 
choice of mnemonic sentence. At reset time, the 
user will go through the same process as the pass- 
word initialization. 
Mnemonics have to be secure. They can not be a 
popular quote, or the lyrics of a well known song. 
We achieve this security by using a previously pro- 
posed password mnemonic system [18] to generate 
our mnemonic sentences. 
It is easy to come up with yeslno mechanisms for au- 
thentication in constrained environments, that are con- 
ceptually simple but that suffer from a lack of security, 
poor usability, or both. This paper presents an authen- 
tication method that combines good usability with secu- 
rity. An important feature of our scheme includes full 
resistance to replay attacks by someone who can observe 
only the user's sequence of yestno responses (but not the 
mnemonics from which they are derived, and that are 
safely stored between the user's two ears): Such an at- 
tacker acquires no advantage whatsoever over someone 
who did not observe the yeslno sequence for that lo- 
gin session (in fact the yeslno sequence is indistinguish- 
able from a random binary sequence). Our scheme also 
offers full resistance to a phishing attack: Mnemonics 
are shared secrets between the user and the authenticat- 
ing server and the users are never asked to enter their 
mnemonics to the system. The users can detect an ad- 
versary that does not know the shared secret. Other- 
wise an adversary does not gain any information about 
the password even if the user answers random phishing 
challenges. 
Section 2 includes an overview of the system and how 
a user will interact with the system. Section 3 covers 
our adversary model. We will discuss the details of the 
system and our implementation in Section 4. The work 
on related literature will be summarized in Section 5. 
2 System Overview 
We propose PassWit, an authentication system that is 
based on mnemonic passwords [18], whose details will 
be described in the following subsections, where P de- 
notes the user's previously existing (and securely gener- 
ated) password bit string (for now we assume 7J is 40 bits 
long, but we can accommodate any other length). 
2.1 Password initialization step 
1. The system generates a number of random sen- 
tences sl, . . . , sx and displays them to the user. 
See Figure 1.  Each sentence has a length of 
p words (not counting functional words such 
as "the", "a", "with). In our implementation 
we used p = 10. For example, sa could come 
from tracing a random left-to-right path along the 
columns of Table I, using some of the password 
bits to select one word from each column. In 
this case, 4 password bits are used per column 
and first column shows the bit string encoded by 
the words in the same row. For example, if P = 
0101100101010011111101001000l0l010001101 
then the resulting sz is Angry union artists simply 
dismissed demand to forgive the laziness of the 
crazy rnayol: Each si is selected from a separate 
table like Table 1 which was derived from a dif- 
ferent text source (e.g., one table from sports, one 
from stock markets, one from animals, etc). We 
did not use advanced natural language processing 
techniques in the generation of these tables, and 
this is an area for future extensions of this work. 
2. The user selects one of the above si's, suppose it 
consists of the successive words m l ,  m2, . . . , m,. 
3. The column from which word m j  was selected (call 
it Cj) contains what we call the equivalence class 
(in that table) of the word mj .  We use r to de- 
note the size of an equivalence class; in our exam- 
ple r = 16. The user does not need to memorize 
the equivalence class (only m j  needs to be remem- 
bered). 
2.2 Authentication step 
For j = 1 , .  . . , p in turn, the system asks the user, .t = 
log, r questions (e = 4 in our example) about column 
Cj, as follows. 
1. The system randomly permutes the entries of col- 
umn Cj before creating the challenges at each ses- 
sion (which foils a replay attack). For the ith entry 
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binary representation of i. For instance last column 
of Table 1 might be permuted as {leader, senator, 
enemy, foe, king, queen, president, chairman, chil- 
dren, mayor, friend, ally, associate, assistant, man- 
ager, supporter). 
2. The system creates 4 sets Qg, Q2, Q1, QO such that 
the ith word of the permuted Cj is included in 
Qk  if and only if bi,k = 1. For the permuta- 
tion of Clo in the previous step, Qo would be 
{senator, foe, queen, chairman, mayor, ally, assis- 
tant, supporter), Q1 would be {enemy, foe, pres- 
ident, chairman, friend, ally, manager, supporter), 
Qz would be {king, queen, president, chairman, as- 
sociate, assistant, manager, supporter) Q3 would 
be {children, mayor, friend, ally, associate, assis- 
tant, manager, supporter). Since the entry leader 
has index i = 0 in the permutation of this example 
session, it does not appear in any of the Qk .  See 
Figure 2 for the challenges of this session, which 
are displayed in random order (as opposed to al- 
phabetical order) as CAPTCHAs for added security 
against sophisticated malicious software (the ran- 
dom re-ordering as well as the CAPTCHA repre- 
sentation are not needed if there is no threat of such 
an adversary). 
3. Fork = 3 , 2 , l ,  0 in turn, the system displays Qk  to 
the user who answers "Yes" if the mnemonic word 
mj (corresponding to the current column Cj) is in 
Qk ,  and answers "No" otherwise. The contents of 
each Qk  are displayed in random order each authen- 
tication round. (There is no need to randomly per- 
mute the ordering of the Qk's to foil a replay at- 
tack, as they have already been implicitly permuted 
by the above-mentioned permutation of the column 
cj .> 
More on the rationale and security of the above is 
said later. For now we note that (i) the user's answers 
uniquely identify to the server the mnemonic word in 
each column; (ii) the total number of questions is log- 
arithmic in the size r of each column, so that password 
security can be increased by a factor of 2 p  by doubling 
the size of a column yet adding only 1 extra question per 
column (and, more importantly, without any increase in 
the size of the mnemonic, i.e., without further burdening 
the user's memory); (iii) a shoulder-surfer adversary sees 
the questions but not the user's yeslno answers (hence 
learns nothing); (iv) that a keystroke-logger sees the an- 
swers but cannot use them to authenticate itself or to ob- 
tain the passwords unless it can relate these answers to 
the challenges (which are preferably obfuscated as in the 
figure); (v) that a phisher adversary does not even know 
what questions to display, immediately alerting the user 
to the user that something seriously phishy is going on (in 
phact even if the phisher got the perhaps-careless user to 
respond to very unfamiliar challenges, those responses 
are useless to such an attacker). The randomized display 
of the contents of a Qk  are aimed at foiling an adversary 
who is trying to decode the CAPTCHAs and might gain 
information if they appear in a predictable order (e.g., 
alphabetical). 
3 Adversary Model 
We assume that the information used by the system dur- 
ing the mnemonic creation is public and the adversary 
has equal (or more) computational power than our sys- 
tem. 
We foresee five possible types of attacks on this 
scheme: 
Shoulder-surfing: This type of adversary is as- 
sumed to have the ability to physically record the 
authentication session of the user (possibly with 
a video recording device such as a cell phone). 
The only thing that appears on the screen is the 
challenge statements, the answers of the user are 
not displayed. After the user answers the current 
challenge, the system refreshes the screen to dis- 
play the next challenge. It is possible to prevent a 
shoulder-surfing adversary from obtaining the chal- 
lenges by displaying them in the form of graphical 
CAPTCHAs [2  1 1. Even though the shoulder surfer 
can successfully record and resolve the content of 
the challenges, the only way shehe can learn the 
answers is by observing the user's activities while 
inputing the answers. For defense against a shoul- 
der surfer that can effectively observe and record 
the CAPTCHA challenges and the user's activities 
at the same time, we recommend the use of input de- 
vices that can be operated easily under the table or 
another cover (such as remote control, mouse but- 
tons or keyboard keys which can be covered by the 
other hand or other haptic devices). 
Malicious Software (Spy-ware, keystroke-logger 
etc.): Malicious software can record what is being 
sent by the authentication server as challenges and 
what is being sent by the user as response. For de- 
fense against this adversary our PassWit can be used 
in conjunction with CAPTCHAs. 
Brute-force attack: This type of adversary has 
access only to the encrypted password file (e.g., 
"Ietclpasswd"). PassWit does not weaken the se- 
curity of the existing authentication system and is 
based on mnemonic passwords, which lets the users 
I , r,
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Table I : The mnemonic generation table for the sentence "Leading U.S. couturiers are strongly resisting pressure to regulate the 















to have random passwords that are secure against 
dictionary attacks [18]. 
Phishing: Mnemonics are shared secrets between 
the user and the authenticating server, and the server 
has to use the knowledge of the mnemonics to gen- 
erate the challenge prompts. Thus, PassWit in- 
herently has full resistance to phishing attacks by 
an adversary who does not have this knowledge. 
The users are never asked to enter their mnemon- 
ics to the system; instead, they will be prompted 
with challenges that can be correctly answered only 
by someone who has full knowledge of the con- 
tent of the mnemonic. Since the users will be 
looking for mnemonic words to appear in the chal- 
lenge prompts, they will very soon (after seeing one 
or two challenges) realize that the authenticating 















Physically armed attacker ("Duress"): Duress 
codes are needed in case of an armed attack, where 
the user needs a way to alert the police, while obey- 
ing all requests of the attacker. Several home alarm 
systems already handle this situation by providing 
home owners a duress code together with the regu- 
lar code. Duress code will turn off the alarm, but it 
will also send an alert to the police. Same idea can 
be deployed for any type of password protected ac- 
count, where the duress code lets the user in, alerts 
the police and possibly asks the system to adjust the 
information accessible to a duress situation. Pass- 
Wit is designed to have duress codes, that the user 
can enter to login under duress. See Section 4 for 
details on how duress codes are implemented. 
I 
4 Implementation Details 
We assume that the environment enables the user to read 
(or hear, in the case of vision impairment) the challenges 
displayed on the screen and the user can input the yeslno 
answers through a switch activated by muscle move- 
ments or brain signals. The system includes a large set of 
tables, S ,  which are already populated offline. These ta- 
bles, such as Table I ,  are used for generating mnemonic 
sentences and challenges. Each table has a unique ID. 
Every table corresponds to a source sentence from a cor- 
pus, and these source sentences are stored in the first row 
of the table. Table 1 was generated using the example 
source sentence "Leading U.S. couturiers are strongly re- 
sisting pressure to regulate the thinness of the popular 
models." 
In Table 1, the first row includes the source sentence 
(since functional words are not used for mnemonic gen- 
eration they are excluded). Every column in this table 
shows a possible candidate word set for replacing the 
original word in the first row. 
4.1 Mnemonic Creation 
At mnemonic-creation time, the system first generates a 
random password, P, for the user (e.g. a random string 
of 40 bits), or the user's existing password is used. Next 
step is generating the possible candidates for mnemonic 
sentences that will encode this password. 
If the source sentence has 10 words as in our example 
sentence, and each of these words have 16 alternatives; a 
random password chooses one word out of each of these 
16 alternative words, hence encodes 4 bits per word, 40 
bits in total. 
leading couturiers strongly t
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As mentioned in Section 2, candidate sentences 
are formed by tracing a left-to-right path along these 
columns guided by the P. First column shows the bit 
string encoded by the words in the same row. 
The system selects the words that encode P. This 
process generates one candidate mnemonic sentence per 
such table. All of the candidate mnemonic sentences en- 
code the same P. 
At the end, the user is provided with a set of candi- 
date mnemonic sentences to pick from and the random 
password, P, to use in a keyboard setting if needed. 
Mnemonic creation concludes with the user's selection 
of one of the candidate mnemonic sentences for remem- 
bering as a mnemonic. (see Figure 1) 
Once the user selects which mnemonic sentence to 
use, the ID of the corresponding table that generated it is 
recorded in the least significant log, IS1 bits of the salted 
hash of the password file entry. 
Since we have many source sentences (say 1024 
of them), the user can choose from 1024 different 
mnemonic sentences generated for each source sentence. 
However there might be psychological attacks [9] to such 
a flexible system; hence we advise only a small random 
portion of these possible mnemonics be given as choice 
to the users. 
4.2 Mnemonic Usage 
The mnemonic sentence is not stored in the system, in- 
stead the source table ID is stored in the salted password 
hash. The authentication involves a conversion of the 
yeslno answers of the user into a password. 
We achieve this by generating the challenges in such 
a way that every yeslno answer narrows the search space 
by one-bit, similar to the idea behind the "20-Question 
Game" 3 .  In our scheme, instead of looking for one ob- 
ject, we are searching for a password that is composed 
of concatenation of several substrings, each of which is 
encoded by a different word of the mnemonic sentence. 
Each mnemonic word is a member of an equivalence 
class, and we need to ask several questions that will de- 
terministically find the exact mnemonic word within a 
class. We ask log, r ,  (e.g., 4), questions to determine 
one mnemonic word, where r ,  (e.g., 16), is the number 
of words in an equivalence class. 
The key idea behind generating each challenge is very 
similar to the idea behind non-adaptive blood testing 
technique [lo]. The area of combinatorial group testing 
concerns itself with performing group tests on subsets of 
a given set to identify defective elements in that set: A 
3 ~ h i s  game is based on asking the players to think of an object and 
answer the classification questions asked by the 2 0 4  Artificial Intelli- 
gence Game device. See http://www.20q.netl 
test for a subset tells whether that subset contains a de- 
fective element. If the set size is r and the number of 
defective elements is no more than d, then the goal is 
to pinpoint all the defective elements by making as few 
group tests as possible. This research area arose out of 
the need to test blood supplies for syphilis antigens dur- 
ing the last World War: Each test was expensive, and 
using one test for each of the r blood samples was unac- 
ceptable, hence the idea of group testing by using each 
test on a mixture of blood droplets from a subset of the r 
blood samples [lo]. The original problem was adaptive 
in the sense that test i + 1 could be designed after the 
outcome of test i was known, thereby enabling a sim- 
ple binary search for the defective element in the special 
case of d = 1. The non-adaptive version of the problem 
is when all the tests are done in a single round, with all 
the subsets to be tested determined in advance. 
The analogy with our problem is as follows: For each 
mnemonic word mj ,  the r "blood samples" are the r 
words in mj's equivalence class. The mnemonic word is 
like the contaminated blood sample. The server presents 
the user with a subset of words from mj's equivalence 
class, Cj, (possibly containing mj) and the user is sup- 
posed to respond yes or no based on whether m j  is in 
that subset (i.e., whether that subset is "contaminated"). 
A shoulder-surfer type adversary sees the server's ques- 
tions, but does not see the user's yeslno answers. A 
keystroke-logger type adversary sees the answers but not 
the questions. The server tests subsets in a manner that 
enables it to uniquely identify mj ,  and then the server 
does a table lookup (local to the server) to derive the 
password bit string associated with mj .  
Does the adversary learn anything from the questions? 
To prevent the adversary from learning anything by us- 
ing questions, it is imperative for the server to use a non- 
adaptive technique whereby all the questions have been 
pre-determined well in advance, as in non-adaptive com- 
binatorial group testing. The questions are therefore in- 
dependent of which item in the set is the "contaminated" 
one, and hence they reveal nothing to the adversary who 
sees them. Using adaptive group testing techniques (like 
binary search) for determining the questions would be 
lethal from the security point of view. 
Our scheme will use d = 1, for which an C = pog, r l  
test non-adaptive solution is well known and in fact quite 
straightforward. We briefly sketch it, for the sake of mak- 
ing this paper self-contained. In what follows Cj is the 
equivalence class of word mj ,  where ICj I = r .  (Recall 
the authentication step described in Section 2) 
1. Let the words in Cj be listed in an order (which 
will be randomly changed at every authentication 
session) as wl, . . . , w,. 
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Figure 1 : Mnemonic Generation and Selection: Initial selection 
of a sentence depends on individual experiences and tastes. 
of i be denoted as the bit string biye-1, . . . , bi,o. 
3. For k = 0,. . . , e  - 1 in turn, the server's ques- 
tion Qk is constructed as follows: Every wj whose 
bi.k = 1 is included in Qk. 
The number of server asks questions, and each ques- 
tion is constructed without any dependency on which el- 
ement of Cj is the "contaminated" one, mj .  The server 
can easily determine mj:  It is the only word of Cj such 
that all of the Qk's that contained it were answered with a 
"yes" by the user. Note that, this scheme is not restricted 
to inputting passwords using mnemonics, and it can be 
used to input plain text passwords when the challenges 
contain single ASCII symbols. 
When the equivalence classes have a size of 16 as in 
our example, each challenge will have 8 words and the 
user will be asked 4 questions. An example question for 
finding which word is the mnemonic word in the last col- 
umn of Table 1 would be as follows: 
"Does your mnemonic contain one of the following 
words?:" 
- "senator, foe, queen, chairman, mayor, ally, 
assistant, supporter" 
The user answers 40 such questions in total (4 for each 
one of the 10 mnemonic words) with a "yes" or a "no" 
signal using the switch (equivalently with 1 for "yes" or 
0 for "no"). 
After the answers are collected, the system extracts 
each password substring encoded by the mnemonic 
words. These substrings are concatenated in the order 
corresponding to the order of words in the source sen- 
tence to form P. The hash of P with the salt is com- 
pared to the hash value kept in the password file (where 
the hash value is stored as in the regular UNIX password 
file). Note that the same password file can still be used 
with the ASCII passwords. 
Our current password size of 40 bits falls short of the 
52 bits commonly used in deployed systems, but we are 
confident that we will be able to exceed the 52 bits in 
the continuation and further refinement of this work. In 
the meantime, even in its present form our current im- 
plementation is suitable for use as a front-end to a 52-bit 
I of the mnemonic sentence involves the users, since memorability 
. . - . . . .- .. 
password system: We would use our system for enter- 
ing 40 of the 52 bits, and the missing 12 bits would be 
handled as private salt in a similar fashion to what was 
described in [I31 - by the front-end essentially trying all 
212 possibilities for the remaining 12 bits. The password 
file would stay the same as before our system was de- 
ployed, as would the password: We act only as a front 
end, for special situations where normal keyboard entry 
is either impossible or risky. 
1 The bidh of icecroam: JYhy a0 ve .... 
2 Angrycnlon atitst$ slmply dlsmlssed .. 
4.3 Duress Codes 
. f . . .  
After the user picks a mnemonic sentence the system will 
randomly decide a position, o, on the password bit string 
, P. This random position information is stored in the 
salted hash of the user. Our system provides two differ- 
ent duress codes to the user. We decided to provide at 
least two duress codes to protect the user even when the 
attacker is aware of the fact that the system has duress 
code and asks the user to write down two different pass- 
words and show which one is the duress code, which one 
is the original password. 
Duress password will differ only at one of the 2 po- 
sitions that comes after position o. If the entered pass- 
word differs from the correct password at any one (and 
only one) bit in this sequence, the system will interpret 
the login attempt to be performed under duress. It will 
let the authenticating server know about the duress situ- 
ation, let the user authenticate and send an alarm to the 
police. Note that, if the entered sequence differs at more 
than one bit from the duress sequence, the system will in- 
terpret this entry as a wrong password and will deny the 
authentication. This restriction is required in order not to 
increase the chances of successful dictionary attacks. 
For example, when the user's password is equal to 
P = 0101100101010011111101001000101010001101 
and o is 37. The mnemonic sentence is Angry union 
artists simply dismissed demand to forgive the laziness of 
the crazy mayor: The mnemonic word "mayor" encodes 
the last four bits, "1  101 ', and the sequence of bits marked 
by the duress marker (37) is "10". Then "president" (en- 
coding "100 I"), and "assistant" (encoding " 1 1 1 1 ") will 
be displayed to the user as the duress codes. The user 
is free to memorize all three or choose the two that are 
easier to remember. 
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Figure 2: One of the possible set of challenges Qo to Q g  that could be created for the last column of Table 1. The challenge words 
are presented in random order and in the form of CAPTCHAs for added security against sophisticated key-loggers. In the absence 
of such concerns the challenges can be displayed as text images in alphabetical order. It is also possible to display them in plain 
text format on text-only consoles or LED displays. 
5 Related Work 
Previous studies state the requirements for increasing 
the accessibility of electronic resources for disabled 
users [l, 7, 6, 14, 2, 41 and suggest possible techniques 
(including both hardware and software solutions) to in- 
crease the bandwidth of input from these users [ l  1,5,8]. 
There is also a body of work for providing access to web 
through smaller devices which have limited input capa- 
bilities [3, 191. These two research areas have a consider- 
able overlap in the design requirements such as assump- 
tion of low input bandwidth, emphasis on usability, and 
the need for platform independence. Trewin discusses 
the overlap between the accessibility requirements for 
desktop browsers for Web, and the requirements for a 
usable Mobile Web in [19]. 
Mankoff et al. discuss the needs of motor disabled 
users for accessing the web in [I41 . They define this 
access as a "low bandwidth" access, due to the fact that 
these users can produce only one or two signals, when 
communicating with a computer. These users usually 
use a switch mechanism that can be controlled in a vari- 
ety of ways, such as button activated switches, pneumatic 
switches, switches that are operated by a muscle move- 
ment such as raising an eye brow [ l l ] ,  or Brain Com- 
puter Interface (BCI) [20]. Mankoff et al. introduced 
the design requirements for accessibility of web pages 
by motor-disabled user, these requirements include mak- 
ing currently selected link highlighted, allowing the user 
access to the bookmarks as links or adding links for skip- 
ping unwanted text. They have implemented a proxy and 
a web browser that can render any given web page and 
convert it into a page that fulfills the requirements of low 
bandwidth accessibility. 
The closest work to ours is the "pass-thoughts" au- 
thentication system proposed by Thorpe et al. [17]. Pass- 
thoughts system is based on recognition of unique brain 
signals send by the users. This system benefits from the 
BCI technology [20] that can take a brain signal, extract 
its features and then translate or classify these features 
into a command. They list the following set of require- 
ments for an authentication system: i) changeability (in 
case the old one is stolen); ii) shoulder-surfing resis- 
tance; iii) theft protection ( e.g. acoustic recording of 
keyboard sounds, or brute force attacks on the password 
file); iv) protection from user non-compliance (such as 
sharing the password); v) usability (i.e. fast and easy 
authentication). In order to fulfill all of these require- 
ments, the authors design an authentication scheme that 
is solely based on training a user to think about the same 
idea (e.g. a place, a thing, or a melody), and recording 
the repeatable parts of the brain signal features extracted 
from this "pass-thought". In theory a password space 
based on pass-thoughts would be very large, since hu- 
mans can generate many different pass-thoughts, how- 
ever Thorpe et al. note that the BCI technology, that 
was available when that paper was published (September 
2005), was not able to provide a communication chan- 
nel with enough bandwidth that can carry a unique brain 
signal. The users were able to input approximately 25 
bits per minute using a BCI device. Since such a low- 
bandwidth has limited the applicability of pass-thoughts 
as a high entropy authentication system, the authors pro- 
vided a feasible pass-thoughts system, where they pro- 
vide the user with a screen that has a grid of several 
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of P300 potential spikes, hence highlight several char- 
acters one by one on this grid using a BCI device that 
allows disabled people to spell words. This BCI de- 
vice records the evoked P300 potentials (generated by 
the brain 300ms after a surprising or an exciting event) 
from a user and highlights a random item on the screen 
for each one of the detected potential, in time the user is 
expected to learn how to control the P300 potentials and 
input the same sequence of P300 potential spikes (i.e. the 
pass-thought) to the system. The verification of the pass- 
thought is performed by comparing the hash of this input 
(recorded spikes) with the hash of previously recorded 
pass-thought. 
In 2004, Yan et al. conducted a controlled experiment 
to compare the effects of giving three alternative forms 
of advice about password selection [22]. This trial in- 
volved 400 first-year students at Cambridge University. 
100 of these students were given the classical instruc- 
tions on how to pick a password: " Your password should 
be at least seven characters long and contain at least one 
non-letter." 100 of them were given a paper that has the 
letters A-Z and integers 1-9 repeatedly on it, and they 
were asked to close their eyes and randomly pick sym- 
bols from this letter to generate a random password, later 
they were asked to write it down and carry that paper 
with them until they memorize the password. The other 
100 students were given an instruction sheet that explains 
how to generate mnemonic passwords. The last 100 were 
not given any instructions at all. Yan et al. performed 
several well-known attacks on these passwords, as well 
as analyzing the statistical properties of these passwords 
(e.g. length) and the frequency of the users' need for a 
password reset. 
This study challenged several widely accepted beliefs 
about security and memorability of passwords: 
1. It is confirmed that users have difficulty remember- 
ing random passwords (Many students continued to 
carry the written copy of their password for a long 
time, 4.8 weeks on the average.). 
2. The results also confirmed that mnemonic pass- 
words are indeed harder for an adversary to guess 
than naively selected passwords. 
3. Contrary to the popular belief that random pass- 
words are better than mnemonic passwords, this ex- 
periment showed that mnemonic passwords are just 
as strong as the random passwords. 
4. This study also showed that it is not harder to re- 
member mnemonic passwords, which are just as 
memorable as naively selected passwords. 
5. Another interesting result of this study is that it 
is not possible to gain a significant improvement 
in security by just educating users to use random 
or mnemonic passwords; both random passwords 
and mnemonic passwords suffered from a non- 
compliance rate of about 10% (including both too- 
short passwords and passwords not chosen accord- 
ing to the instructions). 
The lack of compliance of users can also be explained 
with the lack of incentive. User incentive can be cre- 
ated by refusing non-compliant passwords or by provid- 
ing an easy to use authentication scheme, or by bundling 
small incentives from several systems into a large incen- 
tive. In our system, we provide encouraging incentives 
to the users for complying with our instructions. Some 
of the user incentives we provide are as follows: 
for users with motor disability providing we provide 
a way to authenticate themselves without the help of 
another person, and for all users we provide a way 
to authenticate themselves when they are faced with 
an input-constrained environment either due to the 
lack of a keyboard or due to high risk of shoulder 
surfing. 
allowing the users to pick the mnemonic sentences 
that fit to their taste, hence are memorable to them, 
from a set of mnemonic sentences generated by the 
system. 
providing an easy password reset mechanism. 
In 2005, Jeyaraman and Topkara proposed a system 
that automatically generates memorable mnemonics for 
a given random password [12]. This system is based on 
searching for a mnemonic that encodes the given pass- 
word in a pre-computed database of mnemonics, which 
is generated by taking sentences from a text-corpus and 
producing syntactic and semantic variations of these sen- 
tences. In order to produce the variants of corpus sen- 
tences, they used linguistic transformations (e.g., syn- 
onym substitutions). 
A recently introduced mnemonics based password au- 
thentication scheme by Topkara et al. [I81 allows the 
users to maintain a multiplicity of truly random pass- 
words, which are independently selected, by remember- 
ing only one mnemonic sentence. An adversary who 
breaks one of the passwords encoded in the mnemonic 
sentence does not gain information about the other pass- 
words. A key idea is to split a password into two parts: 
One part is written down on a paper (helper card), an- 
other part is encoded in the mnemonic sentence. Both 
of these two parts are required for successfully reproduc- 
ing the password, and the password reconstruction from 
these two parts is done using only simple table lookups. 


















































a change in the mnemonic sentence, only requirement is 
the generation of a new helper card. 
Note that in both schemes, [12, 181, the mnemonics 
are used as an aid to remember text passwords, whereas 
the current paper enables the use of the mnemonic sen- 
tence to serve as the password itself. In the current pa- 
per our main challenge is to construct an authentication 
mechanism that can work in restricted environments. We 
present a suggested mode of use for other mnemonic 
password schemes that use other media mnemonics in- 
cluding graphics, and audio besides text. The scheme in 
this paper provides resistance to phishing, to keystroke- 
logging, to shoulder surfing as well as to dictionary at- 
tacks. 
The study of Reverse Turing Tests in [16] suggests 
a method to ensure that it will take a pre-determined 
time to break a password with an automated attack if 
the adversary has to use the login system. This is 
achieved by judicious use of challenges by the system 
that require computational capabilities of a human ( e.g., 
CAPTCHAs [2 I]). PassWit can be complemented with 
a similar system such that the adversary is even further 
limited in the time that it is required to break a password. 
6 Conclusion and Further Remarks 
We presented a password authentication system that is 
suitable for use in input-constrained environments, and 
that has many security and password-mnemonic advan- 
tages over existing keyboard-based schemes. Because of 
its compatibility with existing systems (to which it can 
act as a front-end), it can be used in an intermittent fash- 
ion alongside these existing systems: A user may pre- 
fer to use the normal keyboard entry most of the time 
(e.g., at home and in the office) but occasionally switch 
to using our system in certain situations, such as when 
the user fears the presence of shoulder-surfers or surveil- 
lance cameras, or has a temporary wrist injury that pre- 
vents the use of a keyboard, etc. 
Yet another advantage of our scheme is that a truly 
random password does not place any more burden on the 
user's memory: The mnemonic sentence that our sys- 
tem generates is neither easier nor harder to remember 
for a strong password than for a weak password. Once 
users realize this fact, they will tend to make stronger 
password choices (or even use quality random number 
generators for that purpose). Making strong passwords 
more acceptabie to users could perhaps turn out to be a 
greater advantage of our scheme than its suitability for 
input-constrained environments. Contrast this with what 
happens with currently deployed systems when an orga- 
nization forces its staff to use truly random (hence hard 
to remember) passwords: The little yellow stickers tend 
to appear near computers, so that the janitorial staff and 
perhaps even a sharp-eyed visitor gets to read the pass- 
word. 
Finally, our system is nowhere near its final form, and 
we will continue to actively work on enhancing it along 
many directions, including the use of more sophisticated 
natural language processing techniques than the simple 
ones we are using currently. 
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